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“A fair and impartial judiciary is a cornerstone of the rule of law
1
2
and democracy.” Since 1947, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
served as a model for the nation. This is primarily because its judges
have historically been “evaluated on their merits, their legal ability,
3
their demonstrated understanding of the law and their integrity.”
The Court’s national reputation as a judicial leader is also in large
4
part because its judges are appointed, rather than elected. While politics
have always been relevant to judicial selection, the framers of the 1947
New Jersey Constitution built a system where ‘partisan gamesmanship’
did not “interfere with the ability of judges to be impartial and
5
independent.”
Recently, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s decision not to
“reappoint a sitting Supreme Court justice,” the first time any New
Jersey governor has done so, “marks a critical turning point that is an
6
affront to the integrity” of the State’s justice system. His actions
sparked a period of political controversy pitting all three branches of the
state government against each other in a struggle to fill the empty seat
on the bench and shape the Court.
This incident interjected the topic of judicial independence into the
7
focus of many lawyers and judges across New Jersey. This is a pivotal
moment for the modern New Jersey judiciary; the independence and
8
legitimacy of the Court is in jeopardy. Governor Christie’s decision
deeply shook the pillars of the state’s legal establishment.
No governor before now attempted “to control the Third Branch of
9
government through” the judicial reappointment process. In the
1

The Bar Report: Weekly News from the New Jersey State Bar Association, A Case for
Independence on the Bench, 200 N.J. L. J. 18, 18 (2010).
2
All references to the “Supreme Court” or to the “Court” refer to the New Jersey
Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court is only referenced in full.
3
Allen A. Etish, A Suffocating Message to the Judiciary, 200 N.J. L. J. 407, 407 (2010).
4
The Bar Report, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Etish, supra note 3.
7
The Bar Report, supra note 1.
8
Etish, supra note 3.
9
Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court: Robert L. Clifford,
James H. Coleman, Jr., Marie L. Garibaldi, Alan B. Handler, Stewart G. Pollock, Deborah
T. Poritz, Gary S. Stein and James R. Zazzali (May 13, 2010), available at
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nj/Retired_%20Justices_on_Wallace.pdf.
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aftermath of the Governor’s actions, Chief Justice Stuart Rabner
appointed Justices on an ad hoc basis to fill the empty seat. The Senate,
in turn, initiated a political stalemate by refusing to confirm Governor
Christie’s candidate, Anne Patterson, for a recess appointment
10
nomination. Though each branch acted within the realm of its
authority, these actions reflect poor foresight and temperance because
the political repercussions damaged, and could further harm, the New
Jersey political system. The 1947 state constitution ascribes a role to
each branch of government; these roles must be honored to preserve the
dignity of each. Concurrently, it is appropriate to ask if the time has
arrived to alter the system after sixty-four years of experience under the
current constitution. Is the present method as good as any for placing
new justices on the State Supreme Court expeditiously and effectively?
What are the alternatives to improving the administration of justice?
Can we determine whether one of these alternatives would be more
workable in New Jersey? The time is ripe for reconsideration.
The state constitution sets forth the respective roles of New
Jersey’s “Governor and Senate in the nomination and appointment of
11
members of the judiciary.” The Constitution retains “the state’s
traditional method of judicial selection for judges: . . . gubernatorial
12
appointment with the advice and consent of the Senate.” This system
13
has been “in effect since 1844,” and “proposed changes were
14
unheeded.”
A plethora of issues can, however, arise in conjunction with this
rule, especially if the governor makes an unpopular decision. What
happens if the Senate continues to refuse to act on the Governor’s
nomination? Can the Governor circumvent the Senate’s refusal and
appoint any Justice he so chooses? Can the Chief Justice continue to use
retired or lower court Justices to fill the vacancy until the Senate
confirms the Governor’s appointee? With a gubernatorial-senatorial
10
Richard Pérez-Peña, Appointment Fight Divides Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010,
at A19.
11
Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 164 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1969)
(quoting N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 1).
12
Margaret Gordon Seiler, Judicial Selection in New Jersey, 5 SETON HALL L. REV.
721, 721 (1974) (referencing N.J. Const. art. VI, §6, para. 1).
13
Id. at 721 (quoting N.J. Const. art. VII, §2, para. 1 (1844)).
14
Id. For an analysis of the successes and failures of court reformers at the 1947
convention and an appraisal of their goals, see Wolinsky, Arthur T. Vanderbilt: The
Amending Hand (1958) (unpublished Honors thesis, Princeton University) (on file with the
State Library at Trenton).

OKS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

134

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

12/12/2011 2:47 PM

Vol. 36:1

standoff, the Court could ultimately become null if it fails to issue
legitimate opinions. It is imperative that any future action is mindful of
the doctrines of separation of powers, constitutional interpretation, and
15
democratic accountability.
This Note begins in Part I with an overview of the New Jersey
Supreme Court as it stands today, beginning with Governor Chris
Christie’s decision not to renominate Justice Wallace for life tenure.
Part II presents the New Jersey State Constitution and governing rules
for composition of the Court. Part III inquires whether each of the
branches of government has the power to take action in the manner that
occurred. Part IV proposes that the branches have this textual power, yet
they should refrain or proceed with caution because the political
repercussions could cause grave damage to the New Jersey political
system. This Note concludes in Part V with a critique of the existing
processes and proposals for a new solution. New Jersey needs new laws
and a new system to prevent this situation from happening again. The
problem exists here because it is unclear which branch of government
would be best to accomplish such a move. Most importantly, each
branch must exercise its legitimate power to produce a logical, working
result.
I. GOVERNOR CHRISTIE’S DECISION NOT TO REAPPOINT
JUSTICE WALLACE
On May 3, 2010, Governor Christopher J. Christie declined to
reappoint sitting Justice John E. Wallace, Jr. to the New Jersey Supreme
16
Court. Justice Wallace became the first New Jersey Supreme Court
Justice to seek reappointment but be denied by a governor since the
17
state constitution was adopted sixty-four years ago. Justice Wallace, at
age sixty-eight, would have faced mandatory retirement in a mere two
18
19
years because of the state’s mandatory retirement age.
Governor “Christie’s decision not to reappoint Wallace to a
tenured term was widely criticized as undermining judicial
15
Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable
Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1427 (1998).
16
Richard Pérez-Peña, Christie, Shunning Precedent, Drops Justice From Court, N.Y.
TIMES, May 4, 2010, at A22.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 3. The mandatory retirement age is 70.

OKS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY’S LOST LEGACY

12/12/2011 2:47 PM

135

20

independence.” During his gubernatorial campaign, Governor Christie
vowed to nominate “conservative justices who would interpret the law
21
rather than legislate from the bench.” As a result of his actions, six of
the seven members of the Governor’s advisory panel for prospective
22
candidates for state trial courts resigned. Retired justices also voiced
23
their opinion on the matter, vilifying Governor Christie. Among their
criticisms was that, without a seventh justice, the Court is more likely to
decide cases in a tie, effectively making the Appellate Division the
24
deciding level.
Governor Christie subsequently chose attorney Anne Patterson to
replace Justice Wallace. The nomination was stalled for over one year,
however, by the refusal of Senate Majority Leader Stephen Sweeney to
hear this nomination; Senator Sweeney accused the governor of
favoring “rank politics and ideology [over] practical experience” to hold
25
confirmation hearings. The Democratic majority in the state senate,
which holds the power to approve or reject judicial nominees, said it
would not consider Patterson’s nomination until Wallace’s tenured term
20
Mary Pat Gallagher, Constitution, Rules in Conflict Over Way To Temporarily Fill
Court Seat, 201 N.J. L. J. 553, 553 (2010). See also Henry Gottlieb, One of Wallace’s
Closing Opinions Is A Broadside at Intrusive Police Searches, 201 N.J. L. J. 1, 1 (2010)
(“[I]n a break with tradition that ignited a protest by eight former justices and other
members of the state’s legal establishment, Christie declined to renominate Wallace to the
tenured seat.”).
21
Justice John E. Wallace OUSTED: Anne M. Patterson Picked to Replace Only Black
Justice on NJ Supreme Court by Chris Christie, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2010),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/04/justice-john-e-wallaceou_n_562640.html. Justice Wallace was also the only African-American justice appointed
to the Supreme Court at the time, causing Governor Christie’s decision to receive much
criticism beyond the scope of the focus of this Note.
22
Editorial, Judicious Advice, 200 N.J. L. J. 856, 856 (2010).
23
“Gov. Christie’s assault on the independence of the judiciary, a co-equal branch of
our government, should be offensive to every lawyer who values separation of powers and
who was taught to believe that cases are decided on the facts and the law and not because a
judge is afraid that if the governor disagrees with his decision his reappointment will be in
jeopardy.” Peter C. Paras, Letter to the Editor, Christie’s Action on Wallace was Poor
Governance, 200 N.J. L. J. 469, 469 (2010). In 2006, by Executive Order No. 36, Gov. Jon
Corzine established a judicial advisory panel, whose mission is to evaluate and to provide
confidential advice to the governor on the abilities of potential judicial candidates. Recently,
six of the seven members of that panel, including retired Chief Justice Deborah Poritz and
three other retired justices, resigned in protest over Gov. Chris Christie’s refusal to
reappoint Justice John Wallace Jr. to the Supreme Court. Editorial, Judicious Advice, 200
N.J. L. J. 856, 856 (2010).
24
Gallagher, supra note 20.
25
Pérez-Peña, supra note 16.
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26

would have expired in 2012.
In the interim, Chief Justice Rabner utilized lower court and retired
27
judges on an ad hoc basis. Following this routine practice, Rabner
recalled Justice Wallace as a just-retired judge for a short period so he
28
could assist with cases argued while he was still on the bench. On
September 8, 2010, Chief Justice Rabner assigned Edwin Stern of the
Appellate Division to fill Justice Wallace’s vacant Supreme Court seat
during this political standoff and “to participate in new matters
29
presented for the Court’s consideration.”
On December 10, 2010, Justice Roberto A. Rivera-Soto stated in
an abstaining opinion in an otherwise non-controversial case that he
would abstain from all Supreme Court decisions for an indefinite
period, due to his belief that the then-current Court membership violated
30
the state constitution. Justice Rivera-Soto reasoned that the temporary
31
appointment is not “necessary” and is therefore unconstitutional.
Senator Sweeney subsequently called on Justice Rivera-Soto to resign
due to his announced intention to refrain from participating in Court
32
decisions; this move “appear[ed] to be driven by politics, not
33
principle.” On January 3, 2011, Rivera-Soto sent a letter to Governor
Christie indicating that he did not wish to be reappointed upon
expiration of his initial seven-year term on the Court in September
34
2011. On January 12, 2011, Rivera-Soto did participate in a decision of
26

May Rao, N.J. Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto says he will not seek reappointment,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jan. 4, 2011), available at http://articles.philly.com/2011-0104/news/26357874_1_reappointment-christie-conservative-judges.
27
Id.
28
Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Robert Williams of Rutgers Law SchoolCamden).
29
Mary Pat Gallagher, Top Appeals Court Judge Stern To Fill Justice Wallace’s Seat
Temporarily, 201 N.J. L. J. 857, 857 (2010).
30
Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 354-72 (2010) (Rivera-Soto, J.
abstaining).
31
Id. at 354.
32
Tom Hester, Sr., N.J. Supreme Court Justice Rivera-Soto abstaining from decisions
(Dec.
10,
2010),
available
at
in
protest,
NEWJERSEYNEWSROOM.COM
http://www.newjerseynewsroom.com/state/nj-supreme-court-justice-rivera-soto-abstainingfrom-decisions-in-protest.
33
Editorial, The Politicization of a Respected Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2010, at
A23.
34
Chris Magerian, N.J. Supreme Court Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto tells Gov. Christie
he doesn’t want to be renominated, NJ.COM (Jan. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/nj_supreme_court_justice_rober.html.
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the Court and wrote an opinion indicating that he reconsidered his
position and would participate in future cases where Judge Stern’s vote
35
does not affect the outcome of the case. The State Senate passed a
nonbinding resolution on February 24, 2011 calling for the resignation
36
of the Justice.
Governor Christie and Democrats in the State Senate reached a
truce of sorts on May 2, 2011, after a yearlong battle, agreeing to have
Anne Patterson, the governor’s nominee, considered for a different
37
vacancy. Senate Democrats refused “to consider the nomination until
March 2012, when Justice Wallace” would have reached the mandatory
38
retirement age. Governor Christie simultaneously withdrew Ms.
Patterson’s initial nomination and instead nominated her for another
seat on the bench that became vacant on September 1, 2011, calling the
39
arrangement “an end to the impasse of the last year.” The “stalemate
over Justice Wallace’s seat continues,” however, and this negotiation
40
“bypassed it with a rare tactical retreat.” For example, Governor
Christie said “he would not name any new justices until the Senate . . .
41
voted on Ms. Patterson for the Wallace seat,” thereby continuing the
battle over who will sit on the State Supreme Court and defying
42
precedent.
II. THE 1947 NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION
The founders of the 1947 Constitution purported to replace an
outmoded charter for state governance with a simplified and balanced
43
framework that became an archetype for other states. New Jersey
became “a leader in court reform when it” adopted a “unified” court

35

Michael Symons, Rivera-Soto reverses course, will vote in some Supreme Court
cases,
ASBURY
PARK
PRESS
(Jan.
12,
2011),
available
at
http://blogs.app.com/capitolquickies/2011/01/12/rivera-soto-reverses-course-will-vote-insome-supreme-court-cases/.
36
S.J. Res. 105, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011).
37
Richard Pérez-Peña, Christie and Democrats Agree to Truce Over Court Seat, N.Y.
TIMES, May 3, 2011, at A18.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Richard Pérez-Peña, New Tangle in Battle Over Court in Trenton, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2011, at A17.
43
Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9.
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44

plan. The members of the Committee on the Judiciary looked to the
U.S. Constitution for guidance to restructure the multiple courts system
with overlapping jurisdictions into a flexible, yet streamlined,
dichotomy and to ensure independence similar to the federal system
45
through the process of judicial appointments.
The New Jersey Judiciary was plagued with problems prior to the
46
adoption of the 1947 constitution.
Its predecessor, the poorly
functioning 1844 Constitution, “divided courts and concepts of law and
equity, to the disadvantage of litigants, and lacked any unifying
47
administrative power.” Claimants were unsure of the proper forum for
their assorted petitions in the absence of a unified statewide court
48
system. The various courts, including their divisions and judges,
lacked continuity in practice, procedure, and administration.
49
The third state constitution marked a pivotal moment for the state
50
judiciary, allowing the Court to be both revered and reviled. The
44
Seiler, supra note 12, at 741. See also J. GAZELL & H. RIEGER, THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL REFORM 10 (1960). The other state was Delaware. Id.
45
Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9.
46
See Symposium, The “New Judicial Federalism” and New Jersey Constitutional
Interpretation, 7 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 823, 823 (1997) (“Prior to the convention in
1947, New Jersey’s judicial system was described as the worst in the country.”). See also
Adam G. Yoffie, From Poritz to Rabner: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Statutory
Jurisprudence over the Past Decade, 2000-2009, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 302, 320 (2011).
47
Symposium, supra note 46; Yoffie, supra note 46, at 320.
48
Yoffie, supra note 46, at 320.
49
New Jersey established its first state constitution in 1776 and ratified new
constitutions in 1844 and 1947. See generally N.J. Const. (1776); N.J. Const. (1844); N.J.
Const. (1947). See THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
http://www.state.nj.us/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011).
50
John B. Wefing, The Performance of the New Jersey Supreme Court at the Opening
of the Twenty-First Century: New Case, Same Script, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 769, 769
(2001) (noting that “[i]n the years after the Constitution of 1947 was adopted, the New
Jersey Supreme Court earned a national reputation as an activist, progressive and generally
liberal state supreme court.”) (citations omitted). In his 1971 study on the role of judges in
four state supreme courts (Louisiana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Massachusetts), Henry
Glick found that New Jersey judges have a fairly expansive view of their role. According to
Glick, “[t]he New Jersey judges believe courts make policy and they tend to innovate and
even make proposals to the state legislature . . . In this way, the New Jersey Supreme Court
appears to contribute frequently to policy change in the state.” HENRY ROBERT GLICK,
SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 47 (1971).
In a speech at Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey, Associate Justice Virginia Long
proudly stated that the Court “has made clear to all New Jerseyans that our state constitution
is a separate, valid, and important source of rights for the people of New Jersey.” Virginia
A. Long, Assoc. Justice, N.J. Supreme Court, The 2006 Chief Justice Joseph Weintraub
Lecture: The Purple Thread: Social Justice as a Recurring Theme in the Decisions of the
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constitution’s “centerpiece was the Judicial Article, which gave the new
Supreme Court unprecedented administrative authority, vested in the
Chief Justice, to control the administration of all courts in New
51
Jersey.” The new Court is comprised of seven justices, with five
52
justices constituting quorum. Upon initial appointment, Justices sit for
seven years but then must be reappointed and reconfirmed to continue
53
sitting on the bench until the age of seventy, thereby allowing the
governor and the senate a potential opportunity to remove judges whose
54
performance may not warrant reappointment. Additionally, the current
constitution protects the Court from blatant political interference and
55
permits it to establish its own court rules.
A. The Governor’s Executive Power
The New Jersey State Constitution vests the executive power in a
56
governor. The governor has discretionary power to “nominate and
appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and
associate justices of the Supreme CourtFalseNo nomination to such an
office shall be sent to the Senate for confirmation until after [seven]
57
days’ public notice by the Governor.” Several stipulations limit the
Poritz Court (Apr. 18, 2006), in 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 533, 548 (2007); see also Yoffie,
supra note 46.
51
WILLIAMS, supra note 48, at xv; see also Yoffie, supra note 46, at 320.
52
N.J. Const.. art. VI, § 2, para. 1.
53
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 3. See also Edward A. Stelzer, Bearing The Judicial
Mantle: State Court Enforcement Of The Guarantee Clause, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 874
(1993).
54
Robert J. Martin, Reinforcing New Jersey’s Bench: Power Tools for Remodeling
Senatorial Courtesy and Refinishing Judicial Selection and Retention, 53 RUTGERS L. REV.
1, 61 (2000). Instead of one fixed term, another means for ending lifetime tenure would be
to require judges to undergo reappointment for a series of terms until they eventually
reached mandatory retirement age. Id. Like the proposal for one fixed term, this concept has
also been broached in Trenton, but without much enthusiasm. Id. Unless the terms of service
were shortened significantly from the present length of seven years, this method of
reoccurring evaluation would not impact many judges in a meaningful way. Even with only
one reappointment, judges could serve fourteen years. For those who were appointed after
age fifty-six, one reappointment would suffice to allow them to reach mandatory retirement
age. For those who were appointed at an earlier age, chances appear good that most would
be able to continue their judicial careers without fear of termination, since the governor and
the Senate would likely feel reluctant to remove them after they had already completed
fourteen years of service. Id.
55
See id.
56
N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 1.
57
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 1.
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58

governor regarding who can sit on the Supreme Court.
The recess appointment power allows the governor to “fill any
vacancy occurring in any office during a recess of the Legislature,
appointment to which may be made by the Governor with the advice
59
and consent of the Senate.” Such an “ad interim appointment”
terminates at “the end of the next regular session of the Senate or when”
60
a newly confirmed Justice takes office, whichever occurs first. The
U.S. Constitution provides a similar model for this power, which is
61
regularly used by presidents to make recess appointments. In 1889, the
62
New Jersey Supreme Court held, in Fritts v. Kuhl, that the “state’s
recess appointment clause should be interpreted consistently with
federal practice,” noting that the “‘history of the federal government had
shown frequent disagreement between the president and the federal
senate, and the convention could not have supposed that the experience
63
of our state government would be different.’” The drafters of the 1844
Constitution “prudently adopted the language of that clause” of the U.S.
Constitution, “which authorizes the President to fill vacancies” that
64
occur during the recess of the U.S. Senate.
Accordingly, where a statute or a constitutional provision of
doubtful importance is adopted in one state from the statutes or
constitution of another state, it will be presumed that the interpretation
adopted in the state from which it is taken has been accepted as well as
the words after a practical construction has been given to the language
65
by judicial decision. When the members of the 1947 Convention
borrowed provisions from the constitutions of other states, which had
already received a judicial construction, they adopted them in view of
66
such construction and relied on its correctness.

58

N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 2 & 3.
N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 13.
60
Edward Hartnett, Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong on N.J. Supreme Court
Appointments, 201 N.J. L. J. 631, 631 (2010).
61
Id.
62
51 N.J.L. 191 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1889).
63
Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 (referencing Fritts, 51 N.J.L. at 191).
64
Fritts, 51 N.J.L. at 198.
65
Id. at 198-99.
66
Id. at 199-200.
59
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B. The Senate’s Advice and Consent Power
The New Jersey Constitution vests the Legislative Branch with the
67
power to make the laws of the state. In addition, the “Constitution
requires the state Senate to render its ‘advice and consent’ on
68
gubernatorial appointments” to the Supreme Court bench. Under the
formal Senate rules, the Governor must refer all nominations to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, “unless the Senate President directs the
69
nomination differently.” The Senate Judiciary Committee then
considers the nomination and recommends either rejection or
70
acceptance of the nomination to the senate. After receiving due
71
consideration by the Senate, the entire “Senate then votes on the
72
nomination.”
C. The Chief Justice’s Administrative Power and the Temporary
Assignment Power
“The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the
73
administrative head of all the courts in the state.” This provision grants
74
the Chief Justice full power to assign all Superior Court judges. The
constitution also grants the Chief Justice the power to appoint interim
75
judges, known as the “temporary assignment power,” by recalling
67

N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, para. 1.
Stelzer, supra note 53, at 874. See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 1 (“The governor
shall nominate and appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, the Judges of the Superior Court, the Judges of the
County Courts and the judges of other inferior courts ....”). It should be noted, however, that
the Senate has the prerogative not to act on a nomination at all. See De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134
N.J. 420, 433 (1993) (Pollock, J., concurring); Rules of the Senate of the State of New
Jersey, r. 154b (1993) (“All nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during an annual
session of the Senate shall not be acted upon in a subsequent annual session without being
again made to the Senate by the Governor.”).
69
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 427 (quoting Rules of the Senate, r. 150).
70
Id. (quoting Rules of the Senate, r. 151).
72
Ricardo Castro, Letter to the Editor, End Impasse Over Patterson’s Nomination To N.J.
Top Court, 201 N.J. L. J. 688, 688 (2010).
72
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 427 (quoting Rules of the Senate, r. 152).
73
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 7, para. 1. The constitution further provides: “He shall appoint
an Administrative Director to serve at his pleasure.” Id.
74
John B. Wefing, The New Jersey Supreme Court 1948-1998: Fifty Years of
Independence and Activism, 29 RUTGERS L. J. 701, 724-25 (1998).
75
“When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior
Court, senior in service, as provided by the rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily
in the Supreme Court.” N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1.
68
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77

retired justices or lower court judges. Neither “[t]he circumstances in
which such a temporary replacement will actually be made” nor are the
78
candidacy requirements for such a position clear. Further, the
“Supreme Court is empowered to adopt such rules as it deems necessary
or appropriate for the prompt and efficient administration of justice in
79
furtherance of the purposes of this act.”
III. EACH BRANCH ACTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS
TEXTUALLY GRANTED POWERS
The constitution clearly vests certain powers within each
government actor; here, it seems that the Governor, the Senate, and the
Chief Justice all acted within their respective powers. The Governor and only the Governor - has the ability to decide who to appoint to a
permanent position on the Supreme Court. The Senate’s influence lies
in its advice and consent power exercised upon receipt of the governor’s
nomination, but this is not a mandatory action. The constitution merely
contemplates that the nomination will not proceed without the advice
and consent of the Senate. The Constitution also clearly grants the Chief
Justice the power to utilize a judge for a single case, and no textual
restriction on a continuance of this method exists. Scholars differ on
whether the Chief Justice’s power should have a broad or narrow
interpretation. The present issue does not seem to be whether the
branches are acting outside of their powers but whether this is an
effective approach to governance.
A. Governor Christie Acted Within His Authority
The constitution clearly vests in the Governor - and only the
Governor - the ability to decide who to appoint to the Supreme Court.
The Constitution also empowers the Governor to “fill any vacancy
occurring in any office during a recess of the Legislature, appointment
76

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-13(a) (West 2010) (“Subject to rules of the Supreme Court,
any justice of the Supreme Court who has retired on pension or retirement allowance may,
with his consent, be recalled by the Supreme Court for temporary service in the Supreme
Court or elsewhere within the judicial system.”).
77
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1 (“When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the
Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the
Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court.”).
78
Edward Hartnett, Ties in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 32 SETON HALL L. REV.
735, 738 (2003).
79
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-13(d) (West 2010).
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to which may be made by the Governor with the advice and consent of
80
81
the Senate.” This is known as the recess appointment power.
Is the Governor within his rights to assert the need for “balance” in
the respective roles of our government’s three branches? The Governor
of New Jersey holds “one of the broadest appointment powers of any
82
chief executive” in the country. Federal recess appointments are not
uncommon and occur under constitutional language comparable to that
83
of New Jersey’s. This method of judicial appointment and its
constitutional provision were adopted directly from the United States
Constitution, which provides that the President “shall nominate, and by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Judges of
the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
84
established by Law.” Under this approach, Governor Christie could
have acted during a recess this summer. Alternatively, the Governor
85
could have acted when the Senate adjourned for the year, but he
80

N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 13.
Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 (quoting N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 13). “Such an
‘ad interim appointment’ expires at the end of the next regular session of the Senate or when
a confirmed successor takes office, whichever occurs first. . . . The interim appointment is
good until the end of the next regular session of the Senate, unless a successor shall be
sooner appointed and qualify . . . This provision is modeled on a similar provision of the
U.S. Constitution, and presidents regularly use their power to make recess appointments.”
Id.
82
Martin, supra note 54, at 18-19; Stephen B. Wiley, Senatorial Courtesy, 97 N.J. L. J.
65, 65 (1974). Because the governor of New Jersey is the only statewide, state-elected
official, he or she has extensive appointment powers, including the power to appoint
officials who, in many other states, are popularly elected. Id. As previously noted, the
governor appoints all judges in the state, except for judges of individual municipalities (who
handle essentially nonindictable criminal and quasi-criminal matters, such as motor vehicle
and local ordinance violations). Id. Although not quite coextensive with the governor’s
appointment power, the state Senate’s corresponding power of advice and consent is also
one of the broadest of any state. Id. For a discussion of the extensive appointment and other
powers of the chief executive in New Jersey, see CHARLES E. JACOB, THE GOVERNOR, THE
BUREAUCRACY, AND STATE POLICY MAKING, IN POLITICS IN NEW JERSEY 176-78 (Alan
Rosenthal & John Blydenburgh eds., 1979).
83
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution reads: “The President shall have
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 3.
84
Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 169 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1969)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2).
85
Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631. See also Fritts v. Kuhl, 51 N.J.L. 191, 193 (N.J. Sup.
Ct. 1889). The court held that the state’s recess appointment clause should be interpreted in
light of federal practice:
81
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declined to do so.
This power allows Governor Christie to reshape the court in his
86
image with new appointments. The Governor, in exercising his or her
executive power, has the power to overcome gridlock and prevent
87
complete paralysis. Governor Christie’s actions were a poor choice in
the exercise of his gubernatorial power, however, because his lack of
respect for state tradition led to unnecessary discord among the other
88
branches, state officials, and New Jersey residents.

In order, therefore, to ascertain its true meaning, in accordance with the
recognized rules of interpretation, we must seek for the reason and spirit of it,
having regard to the effects and consequences of the construction adopted, and
the source from which the language employed was derived. Was it intended
merely to prevent those offices from remaining vacant, which became so during
the recess of the legislature by some casualty, or was it to prevent any of the
enumerated offices from remaining vacant during the recess of the senate,
without regard to when or how the vacancy occurred? The latter clause of
section 2, article 2, of the federal constitution, adopted in 1787, provides that
“the president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during
the recess of the senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end
of their next session.
Id.

86

Pérez-Peña, supra note 16.
Fritts, 51 N.J.L. at 203. The court elaborated on the Governor’s executive power, as
articulated in Article 5 of the state constitution:
Without detriment to the public, there are times when the legislature is not in
session to pass laws, and the courts not in session to interpret and administer
them, but it is absolutely necessary that the executive power shall always be
capable of exercise. There is no point of time when the governor may not be
called upon to enforce the laws, and there should be no time when he is
incapable of acting. He cannot exercise all the executive power himself; he must
act through the agency of others. He cannot hold the courts or perform the
duties required of his appointees. When, therefore, we reflect that that the
constitution has most carefully guarded against a vacancy in the office of
governor, and vested in him alone the power to appoint certain officers to
perform the most essential functions of government, and that upon him alone
the duty is imposed to see that the laws are faithfully executed, we must be
persuaded that the power conferred was intended to be commensurate with the
duty required.
Id.
88
See Paras, supra note 23 (“Gov. Christie’s assault on the independence of the
judiciary, a co-equal branch of our government, should be offensive to every lawyer who
values separation of powers and who was taught to believe that cases are decided on the
facts and the law and not because a judge is afraid that if the governor disagrees with his
decision his reappointment will be in jeopardy.”).
87
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B. The Senate Acted Within its Authority
The Senate’s advice and consent power is a “procedural device that
the framers of the United States Constitution conceived of as a means to
89
curb the excesses of the executive.” The New Jersey Constitution
provides that “[t]he Supreme Court shall make rules governing the
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the
90
practice and procedure in all such courts.” The clause “subject to the
91
law” grants the Legislature the power of molding procedure. However,
when the issue first arose in court, Chief Justice Vanderbilt interpreted
the provision to apply only to “substantive law” and not subject to
92
“procedural law.”
Senators “could assert that confirmation is an excellent check upon
a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to
preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice,
from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to
93
popularity.” The governor’s broad appointment power further
enhances “[s]enators’ concern about placing limits on the appointment
94
power of the executive.” The “Senate’s confirmation process provides
an effective and constitutionally authorized restraint against arbitrary or
ill-conceived gubernatorial appointments” as a method of employing the
95
well-recognized constitutional doctrine of checks and balances. Thus,
Senators must ensure that nominees are well-qualified and have been
nominated on their merits, as opposed to favoritism or for political
96
reasons, for this “noble and essential role.”
The state constitution simply suggests that the nomination will not
proceed without the advice and consent of the Senate; it does not
command that “the Senate ‘shall’ advise on and consent to an
89

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See also Martin, supra note 54, at 18.
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 3.
91
Wefing, supra note 74, at 702-03.
92
Id.; Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 245 (1950).
93
Martin, supra note 54, at 18 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO.
76 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). However, Hamilton also believed that an independent
judiciary, protected by life tenure, was the best way to secure a steady “and impartial
administration of the laws.” See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961)).
94
Martin, supra note 54, at 18-19; Wiley, supra note 81, at 65.
95
Martin, supra note 54, at 19; Senatorial Courtesy Commission Report, reprinted in 99
N.J. L. J. 505, 518 (1976) (noting Senatorial Courtesy Commission’s recognition of
important constitutional role in maintaining system of checks and balances).
96
Martin, supra note 54, at 18-19; Wiley, supra note 81, at 71.
90
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97

appointment.” Consistent with the plain language of the constitution,
the Senate Rules recognize that the Senate President may prevent the
98
referral of a nomination to the Judiciary Committee. The Rules
99
likewise instruct that without Senate action, a nomination will lapse.
The text of the Constitution places restraints on “ordering the Senate to
confirm a nomination,” just as there is a restraint from “ordering the
100
Governor to submit one.” Thus, the Senate acted within its textually
granted authority.
C. Chief Justice Rabner Acted Within his Authority
Efforts to preserve the integrity of the judiciary or to safeguard its
independence have led to many state inter-branch issues: “[c]ourts
occasionally have been placed in the unenviable position of having to
define their own status in the tripartite constitutional scheme . . . [this
includes] needing to draw lines of demarcation consistent with accepted
101
conventions and a system of checks and balances.” Accusations of
102
judicial overreach and internal clashes result from judicial operations.
State courts hold both the burdens and the responsibility “for rule103
making and routine day-to-day management” of the courts. The
members of the judiciary specifically “play an active, even aggressive,
part in the governance of the state and . . . take a leadership role in legal
104
development.”
The Constitution grants the Chief Justice the power to utilize, or
“bring up,” someone for a single case; yet the Constitution places no

97

De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 433 (1993).
Id. See Rules of the Senate, R. 150 (providing that “[w]hen nominations shall be
made by the Governor to the Senate, they shall, unless otherwise ordered by the Senate
President, be referred to the Judiciary Committee.”).
99
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 433. See Rules of the Senate, r. 154b (stating that “[a]ll
nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during an annual session of the Senate shall not
be acted upon in a subsequent annual session without being again made to the Senate by the
Governor.”).
100
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 433.
101
Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1429-30.
102
Id. at 1430.
103
Id.
104
Wefing, supra note 74, at 712. See also Michael Booth, Christie’s Ouster of Justice
Wallace Tests State Constitution and it Passes, 200 N.J. L. J. 313, 313 (2010) (“If neither
Christie nor the Senate blinks, the Court can carry on business as usual provided its
constitutional quorum of five appointed members is maintained.”).
98
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105

textual restriction for a continuance of this method. Chief Justices
“have not considered themselves constrained” from making
106
“nonquorum-related assignments” in the past. Because the rule that
grants this authority has been established for decades, it constitutes a
longstanding, unchallenged gloss on the constitutional language and is
107
therefore entitled to some weight.
The provision in New Jersey
allowing the Chief Justice to “temporarily assign a judge to sit for an
108
absent member of the Supreme Court” stands in contrast to the
inability of the Supreme Court of the United States “to temporarily
109
replace one of its absent justices.” It is unclear, however, when a
110
temporary replacement may be effectuated.
At a minimum, the constitution permits the Chief Justice to assign
a Superior Court judge for temporary service on the Court, but it is not
clear whether that can be done for a purpose other than to meet the
quorum requirement of five justices. As such, it is imperative to clarify
whether the Chief Justice is permitted to recall retired Supreme Court
justices and temporarily assign them to the Supreme Court, and whether
a justice can even “decide cases after reaching the mandatory retirement
111
age of seventy.” There are two competing views on this matter.
Under a liberal interpretation, the court rules expressly allow the
Chief Justice to utilize lower court and retired justices under a great
variety of circumstances. As such, the Chief Justice may do so to
“replace a justice who is absent or unable to act, or to expedite the
112
business of the court,” circumstances beyond constituting quorum.
New Jersey Court Rule 2:13-2 grants the Chief Justice the power to
temporarily assign an Appellate Division judge or a retired Supreme
113
Court justice in order to “expedite the business of the court” but does
105

Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Frank Askin, Director of Rutgers Law
School-Newark’s Constitutional Litigation Clinic, that “I don’t know that they can’t bring
them up for all cases….”).
106
Id. (quoting Robert Williams, Constitutional Law professor at Rutgers Law SchoolCamden).
107
Id. (quoting Earl Maltz, Constitutional Law professor at Rutgers Law SchoolCamden).
108
See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:13-2 (West 2010); Hartnett,
supra note 78, at 738.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 741.
112
Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553.
113
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:13-2 (West 2010).
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not expound on what qualifies as “temporary.” Thus, the constitution
does not say the temporary assignment power exists only to regain
quorum, and this provision authorizes the Court to promulgate rules
fleshing out power, which may refer to other unforeseen circumstances.
This has potential to implicate the supremacy of the State Constitution,
114
were there a clear constitutional provision on the matter. Section
43:6A-13 allows the Chief Justice to call up retired Supreme Court
115
116
justices who are not practicing law. The mandatory retirement age
does not “prevent the utilization of such senior judges on a special
117
assignment basis” at the direction of the Chief Justice.
Alternatively, the Temporary Assignment Provision can be read as
a narrow, mandatory duty only applicable for making quorum; thus, the
118
Chief Justice may not bring the court to seven members. Under this
reasoning, a “temporary assignment should be made only when
necessary to make a quorum,” and the “judge or judges assigned should
119
be senior in service in the Superior Court.” Furthermore, the Chief
Justice would not have the constitutional authority to fill a court seat on
120
a temporary basis for any reason other than to make quorum. The text,
in its context and its implementation for the first two decades of practice
under the 1947 Constitution, could be said to support this proposition
because the sentence allowing such assignments follows directly after
121
the one stating the five-member quorum requirement. As originally
114
George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 380-81 (1952) (“Where a statute, wholly
procedural in its operation, is in conflict, either directly or by necessary implication, with a
rule of procedure promulgated [by the Supreme Court] pursuant to the authority delegated to
it under the Constitution, the latter must prevail.”).
115
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-13 (West 2010).
116
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 6, para. 3.
117
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 765; Statement accompanying Assemb. B. No. 1419
(introduced April 1, 1974).
118
Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631.
119
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 741, 768.
Not only are both the original and the revised Supreme Court rule consistent
with interpreting the temporary assignment provision of the constitution as
available only when necessary to make a quorum, but the very change made to
the original rule by the revised rule confirms the appropriateness of treating the
identical change made by the Judiciary Committee of the convention as stylistic.
Id.
120
Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Earl Maltz, Constitutional Law professor
at Rutgers Law School-Camden) (“Based on the language of Article VI, it ‘doesn’t say if the
seat is vacant for a while that the Chief Justice can appoint someone.’”).
121
Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (“The rule, which would appear to allow Chief
Justice Stuart Rabner to name a interim justice, is not valid because it goes beyond what the
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drafted, the paragraph specifically referred to using the power when
necessary to make quorum, and the paring of the quorum reference from
122
the final version was a stylistic change. Also, Court Rule 2:13-2 first
included “language about replacing absent justices and expediting court
business” in 1967, but “the provision allowing appointment of retired
123
justices” was not added until 1978.
New Jersey later adopted the requirement that justices do not
receive tenure until they are reappointed, which could be interpreted to
indicate that the framers “intended to permit the Governor and the
Senate to consider the justices’ judicial decisions before
124
reappointment.” Thus, based in part on its history, the constitution
125
does not allow the Chief Justice to fill the vacancy as he chooses.
Furthermore, the constitution only authorizes temporary usages of
126
senior Superior Court judges. Since 1971, justices have “participated
in cases after retirement, ostensibly on the ground that the case was
127
argued and submitted prior to retirement,” but there is no provision
expressly allowing retired justices to be called up for any duties beyond
completing their work in progress.
Moreover, it could be said that this rule should be applied narrowly
because it is wrong to allow the Supreme Court to take license with the
constitution, particularly with those provisions designed to cabin its
128
own members’ power. The Chief Justice would essentially be granted
“unfettered authority” if he or she were allowed to make “temporary
assignments for nonquorum purposes, such as expediting court business
129
as the rule states.” Accordingly, the Governor and Senate are
Constitution allows…Instead, it is Gov. Chris Christie who has the constitutional power to
fill the seat temporarily through a recess appointment.”).
122
Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631.
123
Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553.
124
Wefing, supra note 74, at 712.
125
See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1. See also Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631
(“Adopted in 1947, it reads: ‘Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When
necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in
service: as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme
Court.’”).
126
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 1. (“When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the
Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service … to serve temporarily in the
Supreme Court.”). See also Hartnett, supra note 60, at 631 (quoting N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2,
para. 1).
127
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 766.
128
Hartnett, supra note 60, at 761.
129
Gallagher, supra note 20, at 553 (quoting Earl Maltz, Constitutional Law professor
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responsible for filling the Supreme Court bench, not the judges.

IV. EACH BRANCH ACTED WITH POOR FORESIGHT
BECAUSE THE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS HAVE
DAMAGED AND COULD CONTINUE TO CAUSE GREATER
DAMAGE TO THE NEW JERSEY POLITICAL SYSTEM
The three branches of the New Jersey political system each acted
within their textual authority; however, in doing so, each branch failed
to take into account the best interests of the state, especially the court
system. There is simply no question about the intent of the framers of
the Constitution: reappointment would be denied only when a judge was
deemed unfit, a standard that ensured the independence of the state’s
judiciary. Governor Richard J. Hughes, who was involved in the 1947
Constitutional Convention, stated that “the purpose of the
reappointment process was only to exclude someone who had turned
out to be incompetent and was not intended to allow any consideration
131
of a judge’s judicial opinions.” That standard, embraced and followed
132
for almost seventy years, is imbued with constitutional value. No
governor before now sought to control the third branch of government
through the reappointment process; the threat to the New Jersey
Judiciary and overall state system will inevitably suffer because of the
Governor’s actions.
A. The Current Situation in New Jersey Represents a Classic Case
of Separation of Powers with the Three Co-Equal Branches of
Government at Odds with Each Other, Thereby Threatening
Judicial Independence
The state constitution employs the separation of powers doctrine as
133
a means of distinguishing between the three branches of government.
There exists an underlying general recognition that this tripartite system
“was intended to allocate to the political branches of government a
at Rutgers Law School-Camden).
130
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 631.
131
Wefing, supra note 74, at 712-713 (quoting John B. Wefing, Richard J. Hughes-Public Servant, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 411, 415 (1993)).
132
Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9.
133
N.J. Const. art. III, § 1, para. 1. (stating that the “powers of the government shall be
divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or
persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution.”).
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competence to reach ultimate decisions and to engage in practices that
134
are not subject to judicial supervision or review.” The “exercise of
separated power” by the three branches is complimented and mediated
by a system of checks and balances that has the potential to intermingle
135
the powers of one branch with another. Thus, counter-balancing
devices guard against an excessive accumulation of power in any one
branch, while “the rigors of separation are qualified and government is
136
more workable.” Because this framework is “beset by incongruities
and confining modifiers,” the separation principle has evolved and
137
resolved a commingling of responsibilities.
Despite this framework’s protection, the separation of powers of
the three branches of New Jersey’s government is in jeopardy. Each
branch is attempting to usurp power from one another, instead of
working together and utilizing each other to reach a positive result.
Here, the system of checks and balances is successfully limiting any one
branch from gaining complete control: the Governor is asserting control
over the court by using his appointment power; the Senate is defiant
regarding its decision to not affirm the governor’s nomination; and the
Court is utilizing judges as it sees fit. However, this excessive
entanglement is not what the framers of the 1947 Constitution
envisioned; these separate branches should be working through conflict,
rather than exacerbating it.
The independence of courts holds a special place in the institution
138
of American government, as there is a “fundamental relation between
139
the quality of judges and the proper administration of justice.” The
maintenance of judicial independence was of primary concern in the late
eighteenth century when Alexander Hamilton “warned of the ‘natural
feebleness of the judiciary’” and of the “need to ensure that courts are
not overawed by the other branches,” and that concern remains the same
134

Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 108 N.J. Super. 161, 167 (N.J. Ch. Div. 1969).
Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1422. See PROXIMATE SOLUTIONS: CASE-PROBLEMS
IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 150-206 (G. Theodore Mitau & Harold W. Chase eds.,
1964) (providing brief case excerpts of state delegation issues).
136
Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1422. PROXIMATE SOLUTIONS, supra note 137, at
150-51 (discussing the evolution and judicial acceptance of congressional delegation).
137
Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1422.
138
Id. at 1441-42. See also Maryellen Fullerton, No Light at the End of the Pipeline:
Confusion Surrounds Legislative Courts, 49 BROOK. L. REV. 207, 212 (1983) (“This
function of judicial independence plays an important role in the overall constitutional
structure.”).
139
ARTHUR VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 3 (1949).
135
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140

today.
The method of appointment is “the most important factor
141
supporting the independence of the Judiciary.” With the advice and
consent of the senate, the governor appoints members of the judiciary
142
for a seven-year term. Reappointment uses the same system, and if the
Governor reappoints the justice, the justice remains on the court until
143
the mandatory retirement age of seventy.
A “system of appointment rather than election” allows for a more
144
independent judiciary. Only nine states, including New Jersey, lack
145
any election element within the judicial appointment process. The
large majority of states that “have appointment by the Governor for the
initial selection include a retention election,” and many more “have
146
partisan or non-partisan elections. While in a sense more democratic,
those systems have the tendency to impede the judiciary’s
147
independence.” The founders understood “the importance of strong,
co-equal branches of government to best serve the people of [the] State
148
[and] those guiding principles remain vital today.”
An independent judiciary is necessary to our form of government,
and no judge should have to fear that the outcome of a specific case will
149
be used as a standard for reappointment. Citizens who turn to the
courts for relief are entitled to have their cases resolved by impartial
judges who focus only on the evenhanded pursuit of justice. Litigants
140
Friedelbaum, supra note 15, at 1430-31 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 523 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
141
Wefing, supra note 74, at 714.
142
Id.
143
Id. (Justices after retirement can be recalled but do not serve on the Supreme Court).
144
Id. at 715 (“It is not surprising that the New York and the New Jersey state courts are
activist bodies. Their judges are appointed by the Governor, not elected, and that offers
them some protection from irate voters.” W. John Moore, In Whose Court?, 23 NAT’L J.
2396 (1991).
145
Wefing, supra note 74, at 714.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Statement of Chief Justice Stuart Rabner issued to all justices and judges of New
Jersey. Evan H. Krinick, Governor’s Replacement of Justice Wallace Bucks More Than Half
a Century of Constitutional Tradition, 200 N.J. L. J. 329, 329 (2010).
149
Chief Justice Rabner said, in a statement to justices and judges, “[w]e have entered a
phase when judges of this state may begin to fear political retribution depending on how
they decide a case.” Editorial, Justice John E. Wallace OUSTED, supra note 21; Battle over
Justice John Wallace puts a lot at risk, THE STAR LEDGER EDITORIAL PAGE (May 17, 2010,
6:56 PM), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2010/05/post_8.html.
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should never have to worry that a judge may be more concerned about
150
how a decision could affect his or her appointment. Contrarily, proper
considerations of judicial restraint should require that every judge think
about each decision in the context of its impact on the state’s system of
government and whether it will serve to undermine the respect and
deference that is required for a court to be truly independent.
Judicial independence is a democratic precept that is “critical to
151
maintain the rule of law, unaffected by political concerns.” The
framers of the 1947 constitution intended to create a “powerful,
independent judiciary, free to interpret the law using its best judgment
without regard to the political considerations of the moment;” this
independence reinforces “protections for individual rights and acts as a
152
check on the worst” temptations of democracy.
B. These Actions Threaten Legitimacy and Have Politicized the
Court
Governors generally select justices with their same ideological
153
viewpoints. But how deeply has Governor Christie’s decision shaken
the pillars of the state’s legal establishment? Not only has his decision
been a “radical and unprecedented assault on judicial independence,
[but i]t sets a precedent that will allow governors of both parties
eventually to reduce the Court to a body of temporary appointees with
154
membership fluctuating in accord with the political cycle.” Governor
Christie is sending the message that “there will be no judicial
independence during his administration” unless things are done his
155
way. He argued that if justices fear not getting reappointed, then “they
156
care more about keeping their job than doing their job.” Nevertheless,

150

Justice John E. Wallace OUSTED: Anne M. Patterson Picked to Replace Only Black
Justice on NJ Supreme Court by Chris Christie, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2010),
available
at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/04/justice-john-e-wallaceou_n_562640.html.
151
Statement of Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, supra note 149; Krinick supra note 149, at
329.
152
Editorial, Judicial Independence, 200 N.J. L. J. 334, 334 (2010).
153
Wefing, supra note 74, at 723.
154
Editorial, Judicial Independence, supra note 152, at 334.
155
Robert A. Fall, J.S.C. (Ret.), Governor, in Rejecting Wallace, Misrepresented
Justice’s Record, Says Former Judge, 200 N.J. L. J. 401, 401 (2010).
156
Christie: Justices Too Concerned With Keeping Jobs Shouldn’t Be on Court, 200
N.J. L. J. 393, 393 (2010).
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justices must be permitted to adjudicate without fear of retaliation.
Politically critical cases will “inevitably come before the Supreme
158
Court.” Rampant discretion “in choosing a lower court judge to fill an
ad hoc vacancy” will certainly diminish respect for the court and could
159
lead to discord among current justices. For example, on December 10,
2010, Justice Roberto Rivera-Soto issued an opinion calling the length
160
of Judge Stern’s temporary assignment unconstitutional. Explaining
why he was not taking part in the unrelated ruling on a racial
discrimination case, Justice Rivera-Soto wrote that he would abstain
161
from all decisions as long as Judge Stern was on the Court. Justice
Rivera-Soto reasoned that “any such assignment at this juncture simply
162
is not necessary” because the Court had a quorum. Senate President
163
Sweeney called on Justice Rivera-Soto to resign. Justice Helen E.
Hoens of the Supreme Court wrote that she, too, had “grave reservations

157
Henry Gottlieb, N.J. Governor Rebuffs Former Justices’ Request That He Rethink
Ouster of High Court Judge, 200 N.J. L. J. 313, 313 (2010) (quoting retired justices: Former
Chief Justices Deborah Poritz and James Zazzali and Associate Justices Robert Clifford,
James Coleman Jr., Gary Stein, Marie Garibaldi, Alan Handler and Stewart Pollock).
158
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 760.
159
Id.
160
Henry v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 204 N.J. 320, 354-72 (2010) (Rivera-Soto, J.
abstaining). Justice Rivera-Soto then stated that he would “cast a substantive vote in every
case in which the judge of the Superior Court temporarily assigned to serve on the Supreme
Court participates except for those in which the temporarily assigned judge casts a vote that
affects the outcome of the case.” Hopewell Valley Citizens’ Group, Inc. v. Berwind Prop.
Group Dev. Co., L.P., 204 N.J. 569, 587 (2011) (Rivera-Soto, J., dissenting).
161
Henry, 204 N.J. at 354 (Rivera-Soto, J. abstaining). Justice Rivera-Soto explained
the reason for his abstention:
Today, while constituted as one Chief Justice, five Associate Justices and a
Judge of the Appellate Division selected unilaterally by the Chief Justice, the
Court has rendered a decision in this matter. The Court as so constituted is
unconstitutional and its acts are ultra vires for three principal reasons. First, the
Constitution allows the assignment of a Superior Court Judge to serve on the
Supreme Court only when necessary, and any such assignment at this juncture
simply is not necessary. Further, the methodology this Court has adopted for the
selection of who is to serve on assignment to the Supreme Court does not
comport with the clear constitutional mandate. Finally, the assignment of a
Superior Court Judge to serve on this Court to fill a vacancy resulting from a
political impasse between the Executive and the Legislative Branches thrusts
the Judiciary into that political thicket, all the while improperly advancing one
side’s views in preference over the other’s. For each of those reasons, I abstain.
162
Id. at 354.
163
Richard Pérez-Peña, Appointment Fight Divides Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010,
at A19.
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164

about the temporary appointment but did not formally oppose it.”
After an extended period of refusal, Justice Rivero-Soto voted on a case,
an act which seemed to attract more criticism than his initial protest;
critics argued that he came and went as he pleased, with little regard for
165
the integrity of the justice system.
166
In Lewis v. Harris, Chief Justice Rabner and Justices Rivera-Soto
167
and Hoens, who all face renomination and reconfirmation, voted to
168
deny the motion to recognize same-sex marriage in New Jersey. The
dissents came from three justices tenured until mandatory retirement at
169
age seventy: Virginia Long, Jaynee Lavecchia and Barry Albin. The
majority recognized that this case raised a matter of “general public
170
importance” and “constitutional significance,” yet nothing resulted
because a majority of four votes were required to grant the motion.
Assemblyman John McKeon said that “he did not want to besmirch the
integrity of the court,” but “when split rulings are handed down in this
manner, it is inevitable that individuals would be left with the view that
164

Id.
Democrats, already enraged by Rivera-Soto’s earlier decision to abstain, renewed
calls for him to step down. “This is as bad as it could get…[h]e is making a mockery out of
his position as justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court and putting himself above the law,
as he alone determines. . . . Sen. Raymond Lesniak (D-Union), one of the justice’s harshest
critics, called the decision ‘bizarre.’” Chris Megerian, N.J. Supreme Court Justice RiveraSoto Tempers Stance on Abstention, NJ.COM (Jan. 13, 2011, 6:00 AM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/01/shell_supreme_court_justice_ri.html.
166
202 N.J. 340 (2010).
167
Chief Justice Rabner’s and Justice Hoens’s terms will expire before 2014; Justice
Long will reach mandatory retirement in 2012. Supreme Court of New Jersey: Supreme
JERSEY
COURTS
ONLINE
(2011),
Court
Justices’
Biographies,
NEW
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/index.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).
168
See generally Lewis v. Harris, 202 N.J. 340 (2010). The claimants in Lewis v. Harris
motioned for review pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 (“motion in aid of litigants rights”), which, if
granted, would bypass the trial stage. If such a motion were granted, the Supreme Court
would have granted expedited review to the case arguing for same-sex marriage, but the
motion itself does not mean that same-sex marriage would be recognized by granting the
motion.
169
See generally id. See also Matt Friedman, N.J. Supreme Court Declines to Hear Gay
Marriage Case Filed by 6 Same-sex Couples, NJ.COM (Jul. 27, 2010, 6:49 AM),
http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/nj_supreme_court_declines_same.html.
Legislators who raised the issue of whether at least three members of the court might have
been afraid to touch the gay marriage case because Christie can remove them by appointing
other justices. Bob Braun, N.J. Supreme Court’s refusal to hear gay marriage case raises
question of Christie’s influence, NJ.COM (Aug. 16, 2010, 10:35 AM),
http://blog.nj.com/njv_bob_braun/2010/08/nj_supreme_court_justices_who.html.
170
Lewis, 202 N.J. at 341.
165
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171

the court’s decision was politicized.” Therefore, the lack of a full
bench effectively makes the Appellate Division the deciding level,
erasing the legitimacy that the New Jersey Supreme Court ought to
have.
Judicial appointments may be said to be inevitably political; yet the
issue is not whether judicial selection can be removed from politics, but
“how the public’s interest in obtaining the most competent,
disinterested, and independent judges” to the Supreme Court can be
172
met. The New Jersey court system is unique in that the Supreme Court
is required to be partisan-balanced; though unwritten, Governors must
maintain a “four/three party affiliation split” on the Court, a balance
seen as a “powerful restraint on court ‘packing’ or other means of
173
exerting political pressure on an independent judiciary.” Because this
tradition is unwritten, there is debate as to how many seats on the bench
174
must be allocated to each party ; however, at a bare minimum, it seems
there must be no more than three members of a political affiliation
175
sitting as justices. Therefore, the Governor may not completely
restructure the court in any one direction because of the restrictions on
party balance. As mentioned earlier, governors generally select justices
176
with their same ideological viewpoints. This practice creates a
nonpartisan balance because it is bipartisan by design. An independent,
nonpartisan judiciary creates a strong backbone of reliable
177
jurisprudence in the court’s jurisdiction. For example, in Bush v. Gore,
171
Friedman, supra note 169. Legislators who raised the issue of whether at least three
members of the court might have been afraid to touch the gay marriage case because
Christie can remove them by appointing other justices. Braun, supra note 169.
172
Seiler, supra note 12, at 725.
173
Statement by Retired Justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court, supra note 9.
174
See Letter from Arthur T. Vanderbilt to the Committee on the Judiciary (July 29,
1947), in 4 N.J. Const. Conv., at 729. There appear to be two different interpretations of the
balance: either no more than four from one party, or there must be at least three from each
political party and the governor can pick the seventh justice.
175
Wefing, supra note 74, at 715-16 (“One of the virtually unique aspects of the New
Jersey system is its unwritten but institutionalized requirement that the court be kept
politically balanced. While the Governor theoretically has the power to appoint anyone of
any political party, because there is no constitutional or statutory authority restricting his or
her choice, the courts in New Jersey, including the supreme court, have always been kept
politically balanced. There always will be at least three Republicans and three Democrats on
the court, and one additional member from either party. This is virtually unique when
looking at states across the country. This balance keeps governors from having the ability to
totally reconstruct the court in any one direction.”).
176
Id. at 723.
177
531 U.S. 98 (2000).

OKS FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011

NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY’S LOST LEGACY

12/12/2011 2:47 PM

157

the U.S. Supreme Court had little faith in the Florida Supreme Court, in
178
part because it was Republican-dominated and very partisan. There
can, and should, be more trust in the Supreme Court because it is
nonpartisan; thus, it is important to retain a partisan balance in order to
promote the tradition and reliability for which the New Jersey Supreme
Court has gained national recognition.
V. THERE ARE A VARIETY OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO
REMEDY THE SITUATION AND PREVENT A REOCCURRENCE
OF THIS STALEMATE
The Constitution worked in this situation: “Governor Chris
Christie exercised his power not to reappoint Justice John Wallace, Jr.;
the Senate exercised its power not to confirm Christie’s choice of
replacement, Anne Patterson;” and Chief Justice Rabner’s “power to
assign a temporary replacement for Wallace” occurred without official
179
protest. The three governmental branches, however, acted to the
overall detriment of the state’s political system. New Jersey is in need
of a new approach to remedy the current situation, and perhaps an
entirely new system should be considered in order to prevent this novel
chain of events from happening again. It is problematic that the decision
for this needed change is not currently allocated to the particular branch
of government best utilized to accomplish such a move. Most
importantly, each branch must practice the exercise of legitimate power
to produce a logical, working result.
The most logical solution to remedy this issue would be to enact a
constitutional amendment with specific provisions laying out who may
or may not appoint an interim justice and the qualifications of that
180
interim justice. To amend the Constitution is a very difficult process,
and must be done with great care and specificity so as to be properly
applied to future issues that may arise.
178
See generally Bush, 531 U.S. at 107-08 (stating in dicta that Article II requires the
Supreme Court’s revision of the state court’s construction of state laws in order to protect
one organ of the State from another). The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the
Florida Supreme Court’s decision because of considerable uncertainty as to the grounds on
which it was based. Bush v. Palm Beach Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
Three concurring justices also asserted that the Florida Supreme Court had violated Article
II, § 1, cl. 2 of the Constitution, by misinterpreting Florida election law that had been
enacted by the Florida Legislature. Bush, 531 U.S. at 112-19.
179
Booth, supra note 104, at 313.
180
N.J. Const. art. IX, § 1, para. 1-7.
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To bypass this problem, a constitutional amendment could be
adopted providing for the popular election, rather than the appointment,
of judges. Many states continue to rely on elections to determine
181
judicial selection, by means of both partisan elections and nonpartisan
182
elections. Proponents of the former contend that “elections make
183
judges more politically accountable.” Advocates of nonpartisan
elections assert that “such elections remove the undesirable political
factors from the selection process while still retaining popular control
184
over the judiciary.” Unfortunately, elections, whether partisan or
nonpartisan, produce their own set of problems. Chief Justice
Vanderbilt warned that if New Jersey were to convert to such a system,
it would lessen “the independence of the judiciary by making politics a
185
primary element in their [sic] selection and continuance in office.”
Critics of this process may also argue “voter selection of judges is
impractical because the qualifications of judicial candidates are seldom
186
known or appreciated by many voters.”
Alternatively, the judicial appointment term could be limited to
187
one single term for ten years. The proposal would “partially rein in
181
Id. Nine states employed partisan elections during the 1990s: Alabama, Arkansas,
Illinois, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.
THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS. THE BOOK OF THE STATES 135-37 (1998). Under this
system, political parties nominate judicial candidates through primaries or party
conventions. MARVIN COMISKY & PHILIP C. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY - SELECTION,
COMPENSATION, ETHICS, AND DISCIPLINE 8 (1987). In the general election, these candidates
appear on the voting line with their political party. Id.
182
Martin, supra note 54, at 58. In recent years, thirteen states held nonpartisan
elections: Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. COMISKY & PATTERSON, supra
note 180, at 9. In these states, candidates have been chosen by primaries or nominating
conventions but have appeared on the ballot during the general election without a designated
party affiliation. Id.
183
Martin, supra note 54, at 57. See PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH:
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 47-52 (1980).
184
Martin, supra note 54, at 57. See Thomas E. Brennan, Nonpartisan Election of
Judges: The Michigan Case, 40 SW. L. J. 23, 23-24 (emphasizing the strengths of
nonpartisan judicial elections and the superiority of this system over partisan elections).
185
Martin, supra note 54, at 57-58 (quoting Arthur T. Vanderbilt, Judges and Jurors:
Their Functions, Qualifications and Selection, 36 B.U. L. REV. 1, 36 (1956)).
186
Seiler, supra note 12, at 733.
187
Martin, supra note 54, at 60. See S. Con. Res. 128, 205th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.J. 1993).
This Senate Concurrent Resolution was first introduced by Senator Louis Bassano (RUnion) on September 13, 1993. Id. No action has ever been taken on Senator Bassano’s
resolution, although he has continued to seek its passage. Id. (citing an interview with Louis
Bassano, Senator, New Jersey State Legislature, in Trenton, N.J. (Mar. 20, 2000)).
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judicial independence by infusing the bench with a steady influx of
judges, presumably judges more attuned to the ideology and concerns of
188
the current governor and senators.” This approach could also “more
readily alleviate instances of judicial infirmity and incompetence” by
189
institutionalizing a relatively quick and easy turnover. Such an
approach, however, “would also deprive New Jersey of a large cadre of
190
knowledgeable and experienced judges.” Moreover, it seems likely
that many qualified lawyers would be reluctant to withdraw from their
lucrative practices for one single term on the bench, as opposed to
191
judicial service as an admirable career. More likely, those attorneys
most inclined to do so would be older, in solo practice or small firms,
and “attracted more by the retirement benefits and prestige of serving on
192
the bench than the opportunity for service.”
This appointive approach may be further problematic, however,
because although “the judicial function is circumscribed by precedent,
rules of procedure, and the character of the cases presented,” judges
193
often do “exert a decisive influence on basic political philosophy,” and
the constant turn-around could lead to inconsistent precedent. This may
194
also go against the intent of the framers of the 1947 Constitution.
Regardless of which branch should be the determining factor in
appointing an interim justice, the route to implementing such a decision
must be examined. The governor is not in a position to propose laws,
188

Martin, supra note 54, at 60.
Id. See also William G. Ross, The Hazards of Proposals to Limit the Tenure of
Federal Judges and to Permit Judicial Removal Without Impeachment, 35 VILL. L. REV.
1063, 1065 (1990). Ross discusses federal proposals, but the same arguments can be made
at the state level in a state like New Jersey, which currently provides lifetime tenure after a
judge or justice is successfully reappointed after one seven-year term. Id. As the title of his
article suggests, Ross takes the position that limiting lifetime tenure creates more problems
than it corrects. See id.
190
Martin, supra note 54, at 60.
191
Id.
192
Id. Under present state law, judges acquire pension and health benefits after ten
years of service. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:6A-8 (West 2011). One ten-year term would
therefore make judges eligible for these benefits. See id.
193
Seiler, supra note 12, at 733.
194
“[I]t is only fair that any new [judicial] appointments under this new constitution
shall go through the trial period of one term. If they are qualified they have no fear of not
being re-appointed.” N.J. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Vol. 1, at 589 (1947) (excerpted
statement by state Sen. Frank ‘Hap’ Farley in support of the successful amendment to the
judiciary article at New Jersey’s 1947 Constitutional Convention, providing that supreme
court justices, like lower court judges, be appointed for a seven-year term subject to
reappointment and tenure).
189
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nor does he have the granted authority to directly control the court.
195
Nonetheless, he is the sole administrator of executive authority. It is
through this broad provision alone that the governor may be within his
right to assert the need for balance between the respective roles of the
government’s three branches. Maintaining balance between the tripartite
systems unfortunately does not lead to issuing an ultimate rule on this
situation. At best, the governor can communicate with and make
196
recommendations to the legislature on what measures he recommends.
In the alternative, the Supreme Court retains the right to “make
rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject
197
to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts.” When the
198
case of Winberry v. Salisbury came before the Supreme Court in 1950,
Chief Justice Vanderbilt, writing for the majority, stated that the
constitutional provision giving the Court rule-making powers over
practice and procedure was exclusive, except for matters of substantive
199
law. It follows that the Court has the authority to make its own rules.
Problems arise, however, in that the Court would be able “to take
license with the constitution” by defining its own power, “particularly
200
with those provisions designed” to regulate its own members. This
stands in stark contrast to the doctrine of “checks and balances” upon
which the nation’s democratic principles lay.
Though there may be a concern of justiciability, the New Jersey
201
Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, does not “confine the
202
exercise of the judicial power to actual cases and controversies.”
Courts “normally will not entertain cases when a controversy no longer
exists and the disputed issues . . . become moot,” though this is with
195

N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para. 1. See supra Part II (A).
N.J. Const. art. V, § 1. para. 12.
197
N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, para. 3.
198
5 N.J. 240 (1950).
199
Id. at 242-55. Contra Allen V. Lowenstein, The Legacy of Arthur T. Vanderbilt to
the New Jersey Bar, 51 RUTGERS L. REV., 1319, 1340 (1999) (“Later scholars and
commentators, including Justice Brennan, have recognized that Winberry v. Salisbury
essentially was decided on the basis that the end justified the means, and that Case’s
concurring opinion reflected accurately what the law should have been.”).
200
Hartnett, supra note 78, at 761.
201
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court cautioned
against rendering advisory opinions or exercising its jurisdiction in the abstract. 521 U.S.
507, 524 (1997).
202
See N.J. Const. art. VI, § 1, para. 1. See also De Vesa v. Dorsey, 134 N.J. 420, 428
(1993); In re J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. 101, 104 (1988).
196
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203

exception. For example, courts will entertain a case that became moot
when “the issue is of significant public importance and is likely to
204
recur.”
Consequently, this issue would be justiciable, though
inevitably controversial.
205
The Legislative Branch holds the power to make laws ; thus, an
amendment to the constitution would be the Senate’s most useful and
206
effective strategy. Any such law or amendment should be made in
accordance with the state constitution, in order to have a seamless
implementation of the law. A constitutional amendment is an
overwhelming endeavor and may take a very long time to implement
effectively.
The independent New Jersey State Bar Association may be an
additional avenue for change. This entity furthered many reforms
through the years, and has several committees through which this issue
207
can be addressed. Its mission is “to serve as the voice of New Jersey
attorneys to other organizations, governmental entities and the public
208
with regard to the law, legal profession and legal system.” Reform
through this channel may be most practical for immediate progress, as it
will not have to wait for the procedural hurdles that the three branches
may face. This may also be the most viable option because of its general
independence from political ties and the strength of its members’
reputations and backgrounds. However, the Association is unelected
and un-appointed and essentially accountable to no one but its members.
203
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 428. See Oxfeld v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 344 A.2d
769, 771-72 (1974). A case is technically moot when the original issue presented has been
resolved, at least concerning the parties who initiated the litigation. De Vesa, 134 N.J. at
428. In some circumstances, however, New Jersey courts will entertain a case despite its
mootness. Id.
204
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 428 (citing In re J.I.S. Indus. Serv. Co. Landfill, 110 N.J. at 104
(citations omitted)) (“While we ordinarily refuse to examine moot matters due to our
reluctance to render legal decisions in the abstract and our desire to conserve judicial
resources, we will rule on such matters where they are of substantial importance and are
capable of repetition yet evade review.”); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342 (1985); Clark v.
Degnan, 83 N.J. 393, 397 (1980).
205
N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, para. 1.
206
N.J. Const. art. IX, § 1, para. 1.
207
For example, the Judicial Administration Committee is tasked with “ensuring the
independence of judges, practicing attorneys and administrators….” NEW JERSEY STATE
BAR
ASSOCIATIONJUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION
COMMITTEE,
http://www.njsba.com/about/standing-committees/judicial-administration-committee.html
(last visited October 2, 2011).
208
N.J. State Bar Ass’n, Mission Statement, ¶ 2 (2007), available at
http://www.njsba.com/about/index.html.
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Thus, it may be dangerous to give such an entity this power.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is vital that all three branches of the New Jersey government act
together in order to prevent a stalemate such as the current judicial
situation from happening again or else new issues and ramifications will
arise. All three branches must exercise their legitimate, constitutionally
granted power to produce a logical result in the New Jersey political
system. This philosophy is critical to preserve the dignity and
effectiveness of “all governmental institutions by honoring the role
209
ascribed to each branch by the 1947 state Constitution”; it is also
imperative to keep in mind the intent and not solely the textually
granted authority transcribed in the constitution. The branches of
government ought not to make multifarious or diverging
announcements concerning policy; debate adds to the democratic
process, but a prolonged stalemate benefits no one.
210
Ultimately, the Senate ought to propose a bill and subsequently
pass a law or amendment directing the interim appointment process and
designating the appointer’s role; this would procedurally be the least
controversial route. This will inevitably require more than merely
writing a bill; to enhance legitimacy, the Senate should appoint a
211
commission to assist in the process. The governor could also publicly
enforce the legislative mandate in accordance with the senate’s
212
directive. The Senate, like the governor, is part of a co-equal branch
with which the court may disagree, but which, notwithstanding its
213
disagreement, the court must respect. The formulating of niform rules
209

Castro, supra note 72, at 688.
See N.J. Const. art. IV, § 4, para. 6.
211
“The Legislature may appoint any commission, committee or other body whose
main purpose is to aid or assist it in performing its functions. Members of the Legislature
may be appointed to serve on any such body.” N.J. Const. art. IV, § 5, para. 2. “The
Governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” N.J. Const. art. V, § 1, para.
11.
212
“To this end he shall have power, by appropriate action or proceeding in the courts
brought in the name of the State, to enforce compliance with any constitutional or legislative
mandate, or to restrain violation of any constitutional or legislative power or duty, by any
officer, department or agency of the State; but this power shall not be construed to authorize
any action or proceeding against the Legislature.” N.J. Const. art. V, §1 para. 11.
213
De Vesa, 134 N.J. at 433. In a republican government, the judiciary ought to
construe the legislature’s enactments. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
210
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to determine the correct process and decision-making authority based on
this potentially recurring circumstance is essential. The governor and
lawmakers must hold fast to the highest ideals of integrity and
impartiality when evaluating candidates for the bench and those judges
eligible for reappointment; the fair administration of justice depends on
it.
The time is ripe to remedy this issue because two current justices
will be up for reappointment and one will reach mandatory retirement
214
age during the remainder of Governor Christie’s term. All of the
governmental actors involved must work together to resolve this
predicament. The credibility of New Jersey’s Supreme Court must be
protected.

214

Chief Justice Rabner’s and Justice Hoens’s terms will expire before 2014; Justice
Long will reach mandatory retirement in 2012. Supreme Court of New Jersey: Supreme
Court
Justices’
Biographies,
NEW
JERSEY
COURTS
ONLINE
(2011),
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/supreme/index.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2011).

